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Abstract
This paper deals with an independent auditor’s professional skepticism in 
a financial statement audit. The auditing profession in the United States has 
moved toward new thinking on professional skepticism: the Statement on 
Auditing Standards No. 99 (2002) deleted the profession’s conventional “neu-
trality view” statements. The landmark events following the Enron collapse 
(2001) stimulated the recognition of a new, workable concept: the “presump-
tive doubt view” (Bell et al. 2005). This concept, however, seems not to have 
achieved institutional status in that SAS No. 99 as well as other professional 
statements governing the quality of a financial statement audit have been 
silent in relation to that concept.
Professional skepticism in a financial statement audit (simply referred to 
as “audit skepticism”) is dual in nature: It is fundamentally concerned not only 
with how deeply auditors exercise professional skepticism (this aspect is 
characterized here as epistemic depth) but also how widely or broadly audi-
tors doubt the financial statements (characterized here as epistemic width).
Academics have vigorously inquired into professional skepticism (Nelson 
2009; Hurtt 2010) but almost all from a similar perspective, its epistemic 
depth. These efforts have contributed to a deeper and more precise discus-
sion but have overlooked the other aspect of audit skepticism.
This paper (1) proposes a conceptual framework for a complete view of 
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1.  Introduction ‒ audit skepticism at the crossroad
The Enron collapse (2001) and Arthur Andersen’s unexpected audit fail-
ure (2002) eroded society’s trust in the quality of an independent financial 
statement audit. As a natural response, the auditing profession issued the 
Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 99, which deleted statements rep-
resenting the profession’s conventional position on audit skepticism, i.e., the 
neutrality view, and took steps to cope with material misstatements due to 
fraud. SAS No. 99 emphasized the need for auditors to revise their skeptical 
mindset, “regardless of their past experience with the entity or their belief 
about the integrity of management” (para. 13), particularly when considering 
the possibility of a material misstatement due to fraud and explained in detail 
how auditors can strengthen their responses to the risk of such material mis-
statement. SAS No. 99 has contributed to making auditors’ responses more 
effective and in this sense took an important step toward strengthening the 
quality of a financial statement audit. It has not been clear, however, whether 
the profession, at that time, thought conceptually about the different degrees 
of the skeptical mindset (including the neutrality view) allowable under the 
concept of a financial statement audit. Consequently, SAS No. 99 is silent on 
how different degrees of audit skepticism can be conceptually related to each 
other and how they can be understood as its constituent parts. These issues 
remain an open question.
1-1  Academic inquiries into audit skepticism
Why do we need to bring skepticism into academic focus? First, auditors 
encounter organizational, economic, environmental, and psychological factors 
that may hinder their ability to exercise skepticism. Even though they are 
prudent, skeptical, and competent, auditors’ failure to exercise appropriate 
audit skepticism and (2) presents a more operational definition to which audi-
tors, academic and practicing, could generally agree to.
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skepticism during the cognition process may have a disastrous effect on the 
financial community. Second, schemes for fraudulent financial reporting can 
be extremely complex and ingenious. Although the Lincoln Savings and Loan 
case in 1987 (Erickson et al., 2000), the Enron case in 2001 (Reinstein and Wei-
rich, 2002; Benston and Hartgraves, 2002; SEC 2008a; SEC 2008b; SEC 2008c; 
SEC 2008d; SEC 2008e; [AAER No. 2774-2778]), and the WorldCom case (SEC 
2008f; SEC 2008g [AAER No. 2808 and 2809]) in the United States and the 
Olympus case in 2011 (Soble 2011) and the Toshiba case in 2015 (The Japan 
Times, 2015a, 2015b, and 2015c) in Japan underscore the importance of audit 
skepticism in evaluating financial statements. The complexity and skillfulness 
of the fraudulent schemes may still overwhelm professional due care. Greater 
understanding of audit skepticism is needed.
Even for professional auditors, some new areas may be difficult to deal 
with. Digital documents and enormous amounts of digitized transactions 
(Nearon 2005; Caster and Verardo 2007), high-tech products and complex 
financial instruments, fair value accounting heavily based on estimates (SAS 
No. 101 [ASB 2003]; Martin et al. 2006), and high-growth areas (Martin 2002) 
have increased the need for skepticism during the process of gathering evi-
dence. Knechel (2007, 391) notes that in circumstances where transactions 
and systems have become more complex and the traditional audit approach 
has declined, “more and more of the body of evidence accumulated during the 
course of an audit was traceable to client statements rather than third party 
or even documentary evidence.” In a different light, the rise of the business-
risk approach may have replaced detailed evidence with analytical 
procedures, and thereby may have weakened auditors’ skepticism in critically 
examining the transactions underlying the financial statements. Inquiring into 
audit skepticism is currently an urgent topic because it affects the overall 
quality of the financial statement audit itself.
The importance of audit skepticism has been stressed in relation to fail-
ures by independent auditors. From a historical perspective (for more detail 
see Toba 2011; Hurtt et al. 2013), the American Institute of Certified Public 
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Accountants (AICPA), inspired by its early recognition by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC), began to emphasize the importance of audit 
skepticism in the latter half of the 1970s, and to spread the word to its mem-
bers (Cohen Commission 1978).
Until the 1980s, audit skepticism was of more interest to accounting pro-
fessionals than to academics. The only exceptions were Mautz and Sharaf 
(1961, 96), Mautz (1964, 63), and the Committee on Basic Auditing Concepts 
(ASOBAC: 1973, 29-31). Mautz and Sharaf (1961) and Mautz (1964) approached 
the subject in terms of an auditor’s way of knowing but did not go beyond 
introducing skepticism. They were perhaps the first to implicitly recognize 
the epistemic width aspect of professional skepticism. Scholars as a whole did 
not deeply explore the epistemic aspect of audit skepticism at that time⑴. 
Their insights were not immediately followed by subsequent audit research. 
Not until Shaub (1996), Shaub and Lawrence (1996 and 1999), Nelson (2009), 
and Hurtt (2010) were academic inquiries into the subject restarted.
The ASOBAC (1973, 30) referred to the concept in terms of how an audi-
tor should observe objects and stressed that seeing “more than meets the 
eye” (a form of exercising professional skepticism) means bringing one’s ques-
tioning mind into full play to identify whether any false statements, 
contradictions, or irregularities are hidden in the financial statements, 
accounting books, and records. In other words, the auditor does a “smell test.” 
Thus the ASOBAC noted the epistemic depth aspect of audit skepticism.
As with increased developments/discussions of audit skepticism by the 
AICPA and the SEC, research on the subject, on the whole, has steadily 
─────────────────
⑴　The word “epistemic” as it appears throughout the text is not used in its purely philosophical 
meaning in the basic discipline of epistemology. It is used to mean a context in which more prob-
ability or less probability is at issue. Auditing is never “epistemic” in a strict sense because 
auditors do not fully and absolutely determine the truth or falsehood of a proposition nor its 
knowledge status. In a financial statement audit, they determine whether a particular audit prop-
osition is true in a probable sense on the basis of their observations (evidence), and then form a 
reasonable belief about the proposition. The basic nature of such audit cognition (or audit pursuit) 
is characterized here as epistemic in that when auditors are engaged in verifying a proposition, 
they are engaged in a sort of “knowing about the world” in a broad sense.
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expanded. Since the 1990s, in the United States, researchers such as Shaub 
(1996), Bell et al. (2005), Nelson (2009), and Hurtt (2010) have presented differ-
ent insights and together have furthered the research. However, a current 
controversial issue̶the neutrality perspective vs. the presumptive doubt 
view̶has not been discussed persuasively either academically or practically. 
Empirical research into skepticism in auditing seems to have started without 
a complete set of conceptual foundation.
Taking the presumptive doubt view a step further, Nelson (2009) pre-
sented a conceptual model of determinants of skepticism in audit performance 
(referred to as “the Nelson model”) in which he explained how each determi-
nant affects the auditor’s “skeptical judgment” and “skeptical action” (2009, 5). 
The Nelson model has influenced subsequent research (Carpenter and 
Reimers 2011; Harding and Trotman 2011), including recent extensions and 
reinforcements by Hurtt et al. (2013).
Nelson (2009) analyzed the different approaches to or definitions of skep-
ticism in the audit literature, and then offered a new but incomplete definition 
with a focus on the assertion risk: Professional skepticism is “indicated by 
auditor judgments and decisions that reflect a heightened assessment of the 
risk that an assertion is incorrect, conditional on the information available to 
the auditor” (2009, 4). Nelson importantly has noted an assertion in defining or 
approaching audit skepticism. Nelson (2009) was concerned mainly with pro-
posing a workable model of the determinants of skepticism in audit 
performance, and not with refining the definition or constructing a conceptual 
framework for audit skepticism itself. In this sense, the definition issue is still 
unresolved.
A conceptual inquiry is necessary because it will lend support to explain-
ing: (1) how the two perspectives mentioned above are not substitutive but 
complementary in determining the level of an auditor’s skepticism⑵, (2) how 
─────────────────
⑵　The level of audit skepticism is used throughout this paper as an overall level that reflects both 
the scope and degree of professional skepticism, its characteristics and applications.
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“the neutrality perspective” and “the presumptive doubt perspective” can be 
measured and can differently influence the audit cognition process, (3) how 
financial statement audit skepticism and forensic audit skepticism differ 
(including whether forensic skepticism is reasonable within the framework of 
a financial statement audit), and (4) how the level of audit skepticism changes 
proactively and reactively depending on the perceived risks that auditors 
face.
2.  Difficulties in dealing with audit skepticism
The concept of audit skepticism has now gained increasing professional 
and academic attention. Regardless of its importance, until the issuance of 
SAS No. 82 (ASB 1997), explicit attention to the concept was confined to a 
few academics and accounting professionals. Audit skepticism has been 
defined in different ways, as shown in the professional and academic litera-
ture (Shaub 1996; SAS No. 82 [ASB 1997]; Cushing 2000a and 2000b; Choo and 
Tan 2000; Kinney 2000; PCB 2000; Bell et al. 2005; Nelson 2009; Hurtt 2010), 
but the definition remains incomplete, as several researchers have pointed 
out: audit skepticism has been “ill defined” (Bell et al. 2005, 66), there has been 
no general consensus about the definition (Quadackers 2009, 9), and “the aca-
demic literature likewise has been somewhat inconsistent in defining PS” 
(Nelson 2009, 4). As a result, scholars seem to have reached an impasse that 
may hinder the further development of research on the subject (Hurtt 2010).
Any definition of audit skepticism needs to include both perspectives 
mentioned by Nelson (2009) in his extensive literature survey. He roughly 
classified the academic inquiries into those favoring “the neutrality perspec-
tive” (Hurtt 2010; Bamber et al. 1997) and those favoring “the presumptive 
doubt perspective” (Shaub 1996; Nelson 2009). But, why do we need to choose 
just one of these perspectives? Concepts reflecting both perspectives are nec-
essary for several reasons: (1) auditors do not fix their skepticism at a single 
level, but shift from one level to another proactively and reactively to the 
risks they face, (2) different concepts can mirror different levels of a skeptical 
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mindset, and (3) auditors also need to have a skepticism mix that makes their 
audit more effective and more efficient under given circumstances. Too much 
skepticism as well as too little skepticism must be avoided. These two per-
spectives or concepts are complementary, not mutually exclusive.
Why is it difficult to define the term “skepticism” precisely? Conceivably, 
the difficulty is related to the inherent nature of an audit: audits inherently 
involve a set of actions such as “examine,” “analyze,” “compare,” and “ques-
tion” (i.e. critical thinking) with respect to all information provided by another 
individual. Even without emphasizing the elements of critical thinking, audi-
tors are expected to raise questions during the evidence process, particularly 
in the field. What is considered natural in a practical sense, however, can 
hamper a conceptual inquiry into audit skepticism itself.
There are also fundamental and mutually related factors that make the 
inquiry more difficult: the contractual nature of a financial statement audit, 
the multi-faceted nature of skepticism itself, and the positive nature of asser-
tions.
2-1  The contractual nature of a financial statement audit
An audit engagement starts with a tentative mutual trust between the 
auditors and the management of the enterprise. Generally speaking, people 
want to be agreeable with the person(s) with whom they work during the 
engagement. But audit skepticism does not imply a philosophy of either dis-
honesty or distrust (Burton 1980). Auditors tentatively and subjectively trust 
their clients to tell the truth with respect to the records underlying the finan-
cial statements and their business risk. This trust is one factor in determining 
the nature, timing, and extent of audit procedures (Shaub 1996, 154). As a 
result, auditors may have become inclined to trust the evidence from clients 
at the expense of adequate professional skepticism. They thus face the difficult 
problem of keeping a balance between the need to collaborate with client 
personnel and the need to maintain professional skepticism while minimizing 
the cost of the audit.
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2-2  The multiple facets of audit skepticism
The definitions so far are not broad enough to deal with the multiple fac-
ets of audit skepticism as shown in Table 1. Four categories (general 
characteristics) of factors affect the degree of skepticism: personal, organiza-
tional, contractual (economic), and environmental factors, including the “audit 
culture” (PCAOB 2011b)⑶. All of the factors weaken or increase skepticism. 
The approach to skepticism differs depending on the category (or facet) on 
which one focuses. Its multiple facets seem to have made both the research 
on audit skepticism and the convergence of the results more difficult.
Table 1  Factors that may influence the depth of audit skepticism
Categories factors Related literature
Personal
Traits
Hurtt 1999, 2010; Bazerman et.al. 2002; 
Wooten 2003; Nelson 2009; Quadackers 
2009
Knowledge Nelson 2009; Quadackers 2009; Plumlee et al. 2011; Grenier 2013
Incentives Nelson 2009; Quadackers 2009
Audit experience (practice/feedback 
with fraud)
Messier 1983; Abdolmohammadi and 
Wright 1987; Moeckel 1990; Choo and 
Trotman 1991; Choo 1996; Carpenter et 
al. 2002 ; Payne and Ramsay 2005; 
Nelson 2009; Quadackers 2009
Group affiliation Joe and Vandervelde 2007
Cultural backgrounds Endrawes and Monroe 2012
Organizational
Career levels Shaub and Lawrence 1999
Justifiee (supervisor) preferences Peecher 1996
Accountability to superiors Endrawes and Monroe 2012
Audit firm rotation Nagy 2005
─────────────────
⑶　Hurtt et al. (2013) and Toba (2011) conducted extensive literature surveys, separately but dur-
ing almost the same period of time, in order to identify factors influencing auditors’ professional 
skepticism. Aside from the period covered and the expressions used (“characteristics” or “catego-
ries”), there are three distinct differences in:
1. identifying organizational factors
2. identifying evidential characteristics (or framing of propositions)
3. considering “skeptical action”
The first difference may be easily resolved, while the second difference is quite essential, and the 
third may depend upon the purpose for looking at professional skepticism.
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Organizational
Long partner tenure Bedard and Johnstone 2010
Evaluation of auditors’ performance 
(client-getting ability) Cohen and Trompeter 1998
Audit quality control Hermanson et al. 2007; Hermanson and Houston 2008
Engagement quality review Messier et al. 2010
Reliance on standard audit procedures McKnight and Wright 2011
Timing of strategic analysis application O’Donnell and Schultz 2003; Ballou et al. 2004
Assessment of the material misstate-
ment risk in a financial statement 
account
Phillips 1999
Prior working paper reliance Tipgos 1978; Wright 1988
Culture, including reward system Beasley et al. 2000; Francis 2004
Auditors (engagement, concurrent and 
audit team) rotation Francis 2004; Bowlin et al. 2013
The tone at the top (partners’ emphasis 
on professional skepticism)
ASB 2002b (SAS No. 99); Carpenter and 
Reimers 2011
Time (budget) pressures Landsittel 2000
Contractual
Trust in management Shaub 2004; Rennie et al. 2010
Justifiee (client) preference, credence 
preference
Peecher 1996; Turner 2001; Jenkins and 
Haynes 2003; Earley et al. 2012
Non audit services Francis 2004; Joe and Vandervelde 2007
Interpersonal relationships with the 
client people (management) including 
accounting firm ‘alumni’
Latham et al. 1998; Carcello and Neal 
2000; Beasley et al. 2000; Johnstone et al. 
2001; Bazerman et al. 2002; Francis 2004; 
George 2004; Knechel 2007; Joe and 
Vandervelde 2007; Love 2010
Deadline pressures Landsittel 2000
Environmental
Situational indicators (red flags); client 
risk including management fraud
Uretsky 1980; Benson 2009; ASB 2002b 
(SAS No. 99); D’Aquila et al.2010; 
Dorminey et al. 2010; Carpenter and 
Reimers 2011
Justifiee (the profession at large) 
preference Peecher 1996
Attitude indicators (dishonest, aggres-
sive, hostile etc.) Heiman-Hoffman et al. 1996
Internal Control (management integrity) Beasley et al. 1999; Kizirian et al. 2005
Corporate governance (audit committee) Beasley et al. 1999; Carcello and Neal 2000; Cohen et al. 2008; NACD 2013
Non-routine/non-standard accounting 
matters (entries)
Spurlock and Ehlen 1999; Carmichael 
2010; ASB 2002b (SAS No. 99)
“Revolving door” practice Menon and Williams 2004; Wright and Booker 2005
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Environmental Fair value option use; fair value classification judgments Ratcliffe 2007; Earley et al. 2012, 2013
Note:  This table is based on the author’s own survey of audit literature, academic and practicing, to 
identify factors that are considered to positively or negatively influence the depth of an audi-
tor’s skepticism.
2-3  The positive nature of assertions
The problem of skepticism is closely related to confirmation, auditors’ 
current way of knowing in a broad sense, which has been conventionally and 
institutionally adopted for a financial statement audit. In this context, “to con-
firm” is to “substantiate management ’s assertion with evidence.” 
Management’s assertions are positive, and this positive nature weakens audi-
tors’ skepticism whether or not they recognize it.
A financial statement audit is performed on the basis of the fundamen-
tally positive nature of accounting. Management asserts the financial 
statements to be appropriately prepared in conformity with GAAP, even if 
they are not. Auditors are expected to assume, first of all, that the financial 
statements have been appropriately prepared, then to substantiate them with 
evidence. Ideally, all information provided for the auditors should be support-
ive, but along with a large quantity of supportive information they may 
receive contrary information that the positive nature of assertions may lead 
the auditors to justify. The positive nature of assertions is associated with 
confirmation bias: “Auditors may seek to confirm their hypotheses and so 
may favor information that confirms rather than refutes their initial assess-
ments” (McMillan and White 1993, 443; Martin et al. 2006, 298-299). A 
confirmation bias is structural in that it results from the structure of a finan-
cial statement audit itself; it is not considered only a personal trait. In other 
words, the very nature of a financial statement audit, by itself, can weaken 
the ability to exercise skepticism and, in some cases, actually prohibit it. 
Auditors have too often fallen into the trap of confirmation proneness.
Management has an incentive to present the financial statements with as 
much positive evidence as possible, and auditors must struggle not to be 
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overwhelmed by it. But in actual audit practice, based on analysis of the SEC’
s disciplinary activities in the 1990s, Brown and Calderon (1996, 56) observed 
that three related categories of problems̶lack of skepticism, lack of suffi-
cient evidential matter, and improper reliance on management̶were often 
linked and that “there was too much reliance placed on management asser-
tions. In other words, the auditor was not skeptical enough̶and the result 
was too little test work.” Based on his experiences in audit practice, Wyatt 
(2004a, 50) observed that “clients were more easily able to persuade engage-
ment partners that their way of viewing a transaction was not only 
acceptable but also desirable. Audit partners too often acquiesced to the cli-
ent’s views in the current period, agreeing to fix the problem next year.” In 
short, he was alarmed that the auditors’ healthy skepticism was lessened in 
this way and finally replaced by concurrence (Wyatt 2004b, 26).
3.  Further analysis of the nature of an assertion
Before discussing assertions in accounting and propositions in auditing, it 
is appropriate to consider the general relationship between a statement and 
an assertion. With respect to a statement, Lee (2002, 25-26) states, “A state-
ment, also called a claim, is an assertion about the world. A statement is 
expressed in a sentence, but a statement is not the same as a sentence. A 
statement is what is expressed or asserted, while a sentence is how a state-
ment is expressed or asserted.” Statements are prepared (by management) to 
represent the financial position of a company, but for an epistemic purpose 
auditors are interested in neither the sentences nor the statements them-
selves, but the assertions included in them.
Stalnaker (1978, 315) states that “an assertion expresses a proposition.” 
With respect to a proposition, Cohen (1977, 23) explains that “propositions 
have been treated linguistically as declarative sentences, psychologically as 
judgments, and logically as that which is true or false.” Only propositions can 
be either asserted or denied. They are different from questions, requests, 
commands, and exclamations, none of which can be affirmed or denied, or 
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judged to be either true or false. In the context of auditing, management’s 
assertions explicitly or implicitly express propositions to be verified. To the 
auditors, a proposition represents management’s accounting assertions as 
having a certain meaning. Propositions in auditing, however, are not treated 
as strictly as those in logic. They are determined to be not ether true (yes) or 
false (no) but more probable, less probable, or not probable on the basis of 
evidence, information that is offered to support the propositions.
Finally, an assertion is closely related to a belief (Jary 2010, 2). Assertions 
express what the management believes is true⑷. An assertion is also related 
to commitment (MacFarlane 2012, 80). In the accounting context, assertions 
express the managers’ commitment that they are responsible for the asser-
tions.
3-1  Assertions in accounting and propositions in auditing
The term “assertion” was initially introduced to auditing by Mautz (1959), 
while the term “proposition” was implicitly recognized much earlier (Mont-
gomery 1912, 87). The term “assertions” is commonly used in the literature 
and in statements on professional standards, for example, in defining the term 
“auditing” (Committee on Basic Auditing Concepts 1973, 2). SAS No. 31 (ASB 
1980, par.03) officially recognized assertions, explicit and implicit, under the 
heading “Nature of Assertions.” Since then the term has prevailed in auditing 
literature and professional standards.
Audit cognition is basically assertion-oriented. This prevailing concept 
has led to the understanding (1) that an assertion is a statement by manage-
ment about recognition, measurement, and/or presentation and disclosures of 
economic events, transactions, or conditions underlying the financial state-
ments and also included there, (2) that an assertion is presumed by 
management to be true, so it is positive, both explicitly and implicitly, (3) that 
─────────────────
⑷　Management does not need a guarantee that the assertions are true in order to be entitled to 
make them: some form of justification or warrant is sufficient.
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an assertion mirrors management’s perspective and assumes truth, and con-
sequently (4) that an assertion whose meaning is negative is not appropriate 
for the auditor’s epistemic (verification) purpose in a financial statement audit.
Two studies, however, have recognized negative assertions in a financial 
statement audit: Smieliauskas (1999) in a conceptual type of research and 
Fukukawa and Mock (2011) in empirical research⑸. How should negative 
assertions be treated? To raise this question is significant in that the form of 
an assertion (strictly speaking, the wording of a proposition), either positive 
or negative, may affect the level of the auditor’s skepticism.
Propositions in auditing (referred to as “audit propositions” or simply 
“propositions”) are analytically separable from assertions in accounting (simply 
referred to as “assertions”) because an assertion is presumed by management 
to be true while a proposition is awaiting proof by auditors. Since proposi-
tions mirror the auditors’ perspective, unlike assertions, they are not 
necessarily positive but can be stated either positively or negatively, depend-
ing on the circumstances.
Usually, auditors accept management’s assertions as the propositions to 
be verified. It makes no epistemic difference whether auditors use “asser-
tions” or “propositions” because both are stated positively. However, auditors 
may need to recognize negative propositions when they are aware that mate-
rial misstatements may result from unusual or unnatural events (particularly 
management fraud or illegal acts) and when they are aware of a serious 
going concern (GC) risk. Smieliauskas (1999, 92-93) correctly acknowledged 
the necessity of recognizing “negative assertions” (strictly, “negative proposi-
─────────────────
⑸　Fukukawa and Mock (2011) introduced negative assertions in audit research. Since negative 
assertions may have been unfamiliar to practicing auditors participating in their research, the 
participants might have wondered “Why do we need to consider negative assertions in an explicit 
way?” The idea of “proposition framing” per se has not been explicit in the auditing literature in 
English except when Fukukawa and Mock (2011) use “assertion framing” in their comparative/
empirical analysis of how positive and negative assertions influence audit quality (effectiveness 
and efficiency). However, their analysis contains an inconsistency in that it operationalizes a nega-
tive “assertion” that might confound their results (Maksymov et al. 2012, 15).
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tions”) even in a financial statement audit.
Recognizing negative propositions (negatives) should be restricted to 
when auditors feel serious doubts about the financial statements and the 
company’s GC status. Recognizing “negatives” heightens auditors’ professional 
skepticism and may drive them to perform a forensic audit. Since false “nega-
tives” could impair the relationship with management, negative propositions 
must be implicit⑹. Positive assertions can be either explicit or implicit; how-
ever, false “positives” jeopardize audit effectiveness and increase the risk that 
the financial statement users will suffer loss.
In summary, a conceptual framework for professional skepticism in a 
financial statement audit needs to reflect the negative aspect as well as the 
positive aspect of the auditor’s epistemic activity.
3-2  Framing propositions
It is generally understood in cognitive psychology that “decisions can be 
influenced by how information is presented” (Robinson-Riegler and Robinson-
Riegler 2008, 525). Earlier research (Tversky and Kahneman 1981; Levin et al. 
1986; Levin et al. 1987; Loke 1989) on the study of judgment and decisions in 
cognitive/economic psychology has dealt with “how we are affected by the 
way in which information is presented or framed” (Loke 1989, 329, emphasis 
added). Thus, the way a proposition is framed can influence the level of skep-
ticism exercised during the cognition process.
In the context of auditing, the scope and kind of evidence to be collected 
and the selection and application of audit procedures can be differently influ-
enced by proposition framing (or “assertion framing,” to borrow the 
terminology of Fukukawa & Mock [2012]). But auditors are subject to some 
restrictions in framing audit propositions: explicit negative propositions are 
─────────────────
⑹　With respect to a negative (i.e. a client’s serious GC risk) proposition, a careful consideration 
(analysis) may be necessary, for false negatives have sometimes occurred (Francis 2004, 350). This 
suggests that false negatives referring to misstatements and false negatives referring to a serious 
GC risk should be discussed separately even in a financial statement audit.
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not appropriate under a financial audit, while implicit negative propositions 
are allowed only when auditors face higher-risk situations.
The following is, for example, a list of propositions that auditors may rec-
ognize in order to examine the year-end balance of accounts receivable. Some 
propositions (assertions) are adapted from Fukukawa and Mock (2011, 82-83) 
and Asare and Wright (2012, 200). “P” stands for a positively stated proposi-
tion (assertion), “N” stands for a negatively stated proposition), and “PQ” 
stands for a positive proposition that is questionable as to its appropriateness:
P-1:  The balance of accounts receivable included in the balance sheet as of 
xx 31, 20xx is fairly presented.
P-2:  The presentation of accounts receivable included in the balance sheet 
as of xx 31, 20xx is free from material misstatements.
P-3:  The balance of accounts receivable due from XYZ Company included 
in the balance sheet exists as of xx 31, 20xx.
P-4:  The presentation of accounts receivable due from XYZ Company 
included in the balance sheet as of xx 31, 20xx is free from material 
misstatements with respect to their existence.
PQ:  The presentation of accounts receivable included in the balance sheet 
as of xx 31, 20xx is free from material fraud.
N-1:  The balance of accounts receivable included in the balance sheet as of 
xx 31, 20xx is not fairly presented.
N-2:  The presentation of accounts receivable included in the balance sheet 
as of xx 31, 20xx is materially misstated.
N-3:  The accounts receivable included in the balance sheet as of xx 31, 
20xx are not properly valued.
N-4:  A material amount of accounts receivable that do not exist as of xx 31, 
20xx is included in the balance sheet as of xx 31, 20xx.
3-2-1  Positive propositions
Positively framed propositions, represented by Ps, are basically in line 
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with the Mautz and Sharaf 1961 postulate that presupposes that there is no 
necessary conflict of interest between management and auditors and antici-
pate that auditors can confirm (substantiate) the assertions in the financial 
statements⑺. To the auditors, the financial statements are presented as posi-
tive, and the propositions are similarly positive.
For example, proposition P-1 (referred to as “P-1”; abbreviation for the 
other propositions are similar) is usually framed explicitly because it mirrors 
management’s basic assertion that the financial statements are presented 
fairly. P-2 is basically in line with P-1 in that they both lend epistemic support 
to the fair presentation of financial statements, and also in that SAS No. 98 
(ASB 2002a: par.08 e) requires that auditors provide reasonable assurance 
that there is no material misstatement in the financial statements. However, 
its epistemic task is a little different: P-1 and P-3 favor substantiation with 
positive evidence, while P-2 and P-4 favor uncovering negative evidence or 
negative symptoms or signs that suggest the possibility of a material mis-
statement⑻. Propositions P-2 and P-4 require auditors to exercise more 
skepticism.
─────────────────
⑺　The author thinks that at its roots, the way one frames audit propositions depends on how one 
looks at the conflict of interest between the auditor and the company management. Mautz and 
Sharaf (1961) and Robertson (1979) take different positions regarding the framing of propositions 
and seem to suggest different levels of professional skepticism during the cognitive process.
 　Mautz and Sharaf (1961, 42) presuppose “no necessary conflict of interest between the auditor 
and the management of the enterprise under the audit.” This presupposition (i.e. “postulate” to 
borrow their terminology) implies that both management and auditors are interested in the same 
result, that is, the fair presentation of the financial statements (Mautz 1958, 41).
 　Robertson (1979, 31) and Cohen Commission (1978, 5) presuppose that there is always “a poten-
tial conflict of interest between the auditor and the management of the enterprise under audit” 
(emphasis added). This position recognizes more that management may have incentives to distort 
the financial statements: Management wants to represent the company’s financial position and its 
operations in the best possible light.
⑻　The postulate recognized by Mautz and Sharaf (1961) supports an auditor’s cognitive activity 
(confirmation) in collecting appropriate (competent and relevant) and sufficient evidence to sub-
stantiate management’s assertions. On the other hand, the postulate recognized by Robertson 
(1979, 31) and Cohen Commission (1978, 5) suggests that auditors focus more on “not less-than-
persuasive evidence” (ASB 1997 SAS No.82, par.9; ASB 2002b SAS No.99, par.13) or on negatives 
which may be implicit in management’s assertions (falsification).
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Although P-1 and P-2 equally support the fair presentation of financial 
statements, their epistemic meanings are different. In order to verify P-2, 
auditors must be more concerned with uncovering material misstatements 
(negative evidence) because they have to focus on negative instances which 
may lead to material misstatements. In other words, under this proposition 
framing, the auditors are asked not only to simply confirm P-2 with positive 
evidence but also to more consciously uncover negative instances against P-2, 
a negative approach that has already been recognized in SAS No. 99 (for 
example, ASB 2002b, pars. 51 - 68). Recognizing P-2 demands a heightened 
degree of professional skepticism in gathering and evaluating audit evidence. 
Such an audit thus outgrows its purely confirmatory framework, laying more 
stress on its detective facet.
Auditors can verify propositions, even though they are syntactically dif-
ferent, with different approaches to framing them and with different ways of 
verification (confirmation and falsification) and so with different levels of 
skepticism.
Finally, proposition PQ is stated positively but has to be considered prob-
lematic. Auditors will be required to assess whether the financial statements 
are free from material misstatements. Such an assessment is essential 
because the subject of the audit is a statement, not a human act (fraud, ille-
gality, noncompliance, etc.). Professional standards demand that auditors 
proactively uncover inappropriate acts which (may) result in material mis-
statements, but this does not mean that PQ is appropriate under a financial 
statement audit. The concept of fraud is defined as “an intentional wrongful 
act with the purpose of deceiving or causing harm to another party” (Arens 
and Loebbecke 1988, 103); thus recognizing PQ makes the financial statement 
audit a forensic audit wearing a statement audit costume.
3-2-2  Negative propositions
Negative propositions, Ns, are not appropriate except when auditors face 
unusual or abnormal situations, because management does not explicitly 
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include negative assertions (proposition Ns) in the financial statements. For 
example, in order to verify N-4, auditors would have to examine all of the 
open account sales transactions and focus their resources on uncovering 
something that presumably does not exist (namely, fictitious accounts receiv-
able), using audit procedures that can no longer be described as normal. Such 
examinations do embody skepticism, but such professional skepticism can, at 
best, be described as unhealthy.
Negative propositions may, however, be implicitly recognized when audi-
tors perceive a higher risk that fictitious accounts receivable are included in 
the balance sheet, when they uncover material deficiencies in internal con-
trols, or when they become aware of a serious GC risk. In these situations, 
the degree of professional skepticism should be heightened and auditors need 
to focus on uncovering negative instances about the propositions. In actual 
practice, the auditors might already have implicitly recognized N proposi-
tions.
Depending on the situation, auditors may consider whether to recognize 
negative propositions so that they can share them with members of the audit 
team and with the audit committee of the board of directors, particularly 
when the auditors believe that complicated financial fraud involving external 
interested parties has been planned by management. Some practicing audi-
tors (Bernardi 1994; Davidson 1994) have expressed objections, but at the 
same time acknowledged research opportunities related to negative proposi-
tions (Davidson 1994, 87).
Evidence provided by a client, in particular, documentary evidence and 
oral evidence, attempts to support management’s assertions. Auditors are 
generally occupied with the positive nature of evidence, even if only appar-
ently positive, and although they have often been deceived, it does not 
necessarily follow that they have lacked skepticism. The positive nature of 
evidence weakens auditors’ inquisitiveness. Behaviors such as pretending not 
to recognize, compromising judgment without seeking further evidence, tak-
ing the whole explanation by management on trust, and failing to gather 
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additional evidence from a different source have repeatedly been revealed in 
audit failures in the U.S.A. and Japan. Such failures may demonstrate that 
false positives are inherent in any type of a statement audit. One purpose of 
heightening skepticism is to cope with epistemic problems caused by eviden-
tial positives. Auditors need to be very clear about what they are looking for 
and the relevance of their findings. In addition, they must always check docu-
ments for authenticity or any possible alteration.
4.  Professional skepticism as an ongoing process
Professional skepticism is not an on or off issue. It needs to be exercised 
throughout the audit cognition process, starting from the planning stage, con-
tinuing through the testing and evidence-evaluating stage in the field, and 
again in reflectively reviewing the effectiveness of the testing, the findings, 
and the audit judgments. The level of professional skepticism is determined 
proactively based on the risks in relation to the client, the account, the types 
of transactions, and the presentations to be examined and then is revised 
reactively to what is actually perceived in the field. In this sense, the applica-
tion of professional skepticism is an ongoing process that does not stop until 
the auditors form a reasonable basis for expressing an opinion. It is “a contin-
uum” (Glover and Prawitt 2013, ii). In the next section, the relationship 
between professional skepticism and the audit cognition process is examined 
in more detail.
4-1  Audit cognition process and professional skepticism
Professional skepticism influences not only the reliability of the results of 
audit cognition and overall audit quality, but also the volume of resources 
consumed and ultimately the cost. Insufficient skepticism may result in an 
ineffective audit, while excessive skepticism results in an inefficient audit. 
Ideally, professional skepticism should be defined so that its level cost and 
quality can be measured, but “just as it is difficult to measure auditor inde-
pendence, per se, it is difficult to measure professional skepticism” (Doucet 
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and Doucet 1996, 158).
Audit cognition is a mental process of making judgmental activities that 
start with (1) framing a proposition to be verified, (2) collecting evidence, test-
ing, and documenting it, (3) assessing both the quantity and quality of the 
evidence, and finally (4) forming a belief about the proposition. The activities 
that lead to the formation of beliefs as to the fair presentation of the financial 
statements should be purely evidence-related. Professional skepticism, audit 
cognition, and audit quality are closely interrelated. A heightened level of pro-
fessional skepticism supports the effectiveness of cognition, which leads to a 
high-quality financial statement audit. Figure 1 shows the relationship 
between each stage of audit cognition and professional skepticism. Stage (1) 
and the remaining three stages (2)-(4) have separate meanings in audit cogni-
tion.
Figure 1  Professional skepticism and the audit cognition process















Planning audit programs                                        




and audit team discussions
Audit    Cogni�on 
Feedback to the previous stages
Note: The original Figure 1 is in Japanese (Toba 2014).
87
An Inquiry into the Concept of Professional Skepticism 
in a Financial Statement Audit
175
4-1-1  Stage (1): Framing audit propositions
Stage (1) is concerned with the way propositions are selected and framed. 
Propositions play a vital role in audit cognition because the kind of evidence, 
how much evidence is collected, how the evidence is assessed, and finally 
whether the belief about the propositions is reasonable depend on how the 
propositions are framed, tested, and interpreted.
Stage (1) is related to planning audit programs: auditors “establish a level 
of professional skepticism that is proper to achieve reasonable assurance that 
material errors or irregularities will be detected” (Wallace 1991, 19) through 
conducting initial risk assessment. In particular, SAS No. 99 (ASB 2002b) 
requires that, in planning audit programs, auditors recognize propositions in 
such a way as to display professional skepticism in response to their assess-
ment of the risk of fraud (also see Payne and Ramsay 2005). Stage (1) also 
includes the team’s discussions about the appropriateness of the propositions: 
PCAOB (2007) inspectors have warned about audits in which the team’s dis-
cussion session occurs only after stages (1) and (2) have begun. The Institute 
of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW: 2012, 3) has recog-
nized the organizational aspect of professional skepticism with references to 
skepticism as a behavioral issue for the entire audit team.
The way propositions are framed influences the auditors in gathering 
supporting evidence, both in quality and quantity, in examining the suffi-
ciency and competence of the evidence, and in reading working papers 
carefully so as not to overlook negative instances or signs. A heightened level 
of professional skepticism may initially or reactively demand P-2 in place of 
P-1. For example, uncovering material deficiencies in internal controls may 
require that the auditor ensure that the accounts receivable are free from 
material misstatements (P-2), not to simply confirm that they are fairly pre-
sented (P-1).
4-1-2  Stage (2) with using checklists and documentation
Stage (2), the center of the audit cognition process, is related to perform-
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ing audit procedures: collecting relevant evidence, assessing its reliability, and 
then performing substantive testing to ascertain that the propositions are 
supported evidentially. Stage (2) is usually performed through programs with 
checklists (simply referred to as “audit programs) and documented in work-
ing papers.
Audit programs are a means by which an accounting firm can manage 
the overall quality of the audit as well as provide the audit staff with specific 
objectives or related detailed instructions for a particular audit procedure 
(including propositions). Audit programs are developed on the basis of the 
firm’s policies as well as professional standards (The AICPA’s Statements on 
Auditing Standards [SASs] and the PCAOB’s Auditing Standards [ASs]). They 
convey to the staff what to do in the field so that the firm can ensure that its 
quality requirements are met. However, more attention needs to be paid to 
the negative aspect of checklists. Audit programs also state specific self-disci-
plined norms that the staff members must follow to discharge their epistemic 
responsibility in the field. The normative nature of checklists may, therefore, 
breed both a “check-the-box” mentality and a “compliance“ mentality and may 
gradually make the staff less skeptical and more prone to confirmation. SAS 
No. 99 (ASB 2002b), as Ramos (2003, 36) recognized, “is a standard that 
reaches into all areas of the audit process and it moves auditors in a different 
direction, away from the ‘checklist mentality’ and more into a thinking per-
son’s audit.” The perception that using a checklist may hinder the auditor’s 
professional skepticism is also found in the IAASB Discussion Paper (IAASB 
2011, par.72).
With respect to stage (2) and in relation to the Lincoln Savings and Loan 
audit failure, Erickson et al. (2000) noted that even if auditors had collected 
sufficient information or data from management, if they failed to exercise the 
required skepticism and to apply the most effective audit procedures, they 
might have overlooked management fraud. Auditors need to exercise skepti-
cism not only outwardly (that is, assessing the competence of evidence 
collected) but also inwardly (that is, reflecting on their own evidential judg-
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ments and conclusions). Heightening the skeptical mindset, both outwardly 
and inwardly, is possible only when auditors look not only at “what is there” 
but at “what isn’t there that could be.” That is why getting to know the client 
and its industry is so important.
Stage (2) also includes documenting the evidence and the reasoning pro-
cess the auditors followed. In particular, documenting the full set of audit 
evidence, not only for confirming the propositions but also for disconfirming 
them or for finding negative signs and alternatives, is important in increasing 
professional skepticism at the organizational level (Vanilla et al. 2011, 13). 
With respect to documentation, PCAOB inspectors expressed their concerns 
about insufficient skepticism: “[Auditors] often document their consideration 
of fraud merely by checking off items on standard audit programs and check-
lists” (PCAOB 2007, 3). In this connection, the Chartered Professional 
Accountants of Canada (2013) emphasizes the linkage between the exercise 
of and documentation of professional skepticism.
Working papers are a way for the audit staff to show their accountability 
for performing the audit properly. To successfully perform epistemic activi-
ties in the field, the audit staff needs to examine, analyze, and question all of 
the information (that is, “to think critically”)⑼. Critical thinking cannot be pro-
grammed through audit checklists. Therefore, more emphasis should be given 
to how documentation and review work in the cognition process (Solomon 
and Trotman 1997, 493; Power 2003, 386). Francis (1994, 260-261) has already 
noted that “working papers become the discursive representation of the audi-
tor’s deliberation, discernment and judgment,” and an “audit may even 
─────────────────
⑼　The expressions “to think critically” and “critical thinking” are often used not only in educa-
tional institutions, but also in professional organizations. Woodhouse (2006, 42), who points out that 
“critical thinking” is distinct from “thinking” or “thinking hard,” gives the following definition: 
“Critical thinking is purposeful, goal-directed thinking that follows a principled, reasoned track.” He 
amplifies the definition: Critical thinking is “‘means to ends’ thinking. It is ‘getting from point A to 
point B’ thinking. It is ‘problem-solving thinking” (41). Fisher (2011, 4) also introduces a widely-
used definition given by Norris and Ennis (1989): “Critical thinking is reasonable, reflective 
thinking that is focused on deciding what to believe or do.”
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become more focused on the production [and reviewing] of working papers 
than on the ‘doing’ of an audit.” Working papers should include what the audit 
staff observes, examines, analyzes, questions, figures out, and concludes, and 
finally what needs to be conveyed to the senior member of the team with 
respect to the proposition.
Peecher et al. (2013, 613-61), however, have recognized a potential prob-
lem with the traditional style of working papers. Not all of the information 
obtained during the audit is written in the working papers: a huge amount of 
implicit information underlies the explicitness and may remain in the auditor’
s mind. The style of the working papers, therefore, needs to encourage the 
audit staff to freely convey implicitness and not diminish the degree of skep-
ticism in those who review them. Improving the conventional style of 
working papers may be useful in making explicit what has been only implicit.
4-1-3  Stage (3): Reviewing working papers
Stage (3) is related to reviewing working papers and to sharing with 
other team members what auditors have examined, obtained, and concluded. 
Professional skepticism at stage (3) is exercised organizationally. Reviewers, 
senior auditors, or concurrent reviewers must understand that judgment and 
intent, which are usually implicit, are difficult to document and even more dif-
ficult to prove in a lawsuit. SAS No. 108 (ASB 2006b, par. 29) recognizes the 
importance of audit team discussions in exercising professional skepticism 
when gathering (stage [2]) and evaluating evidence (stages [3] and [4]). A 
heightened level of skepticism is necessary in reviewing the working papers 
because material negative evidence or negative signs may have been over-
looked in the field and because “evidence fabrication” and “evidence 
marshaling” may be involved in the documentation (Solomon and Trotman 
1997, 493-495). In addition, when audit staff are not certain that there is a 
problem, even though something seems slightly unnatural or suspicious, they 
are inclined to document nothing or little about it in order to escape the addi-
tional work of making their suspicions explicit in working papers. In this 
91
An Inquiry into the Concept of Professional Skepticism 
in a Financial Statement Audit
179
sense, reviewers of working papers must keep in mind that such uncertain 
items and conditions may be implied but may not have been documented: the 
audit staff’s incentives are not always well-aligned with the partner’s incen-
tives.
4-1-4  Stage (4): Overall review and audit team discussion
Stage (4) is related to review by concurrent reviewers and discussions 
by the audit team and thus also represents professional skepticism at the 
firm or organizational level. At the highest degree of professional skepticism, 
the audit firm (engagement partners and concurrent reviewers) may decide 
to conduct a “stress test” (APB 2012a, 4 and 7) or employ forensic procedures 
to handle critical accounting/auditing issues.
As Figure 1 shows, professional skepticism should be applied at all four 
stages of the cognition process. Depending on the findings (counter-instances 
or negative signs suggested in working papers and other doubts raised in 
team discussions), auditors may need to revise the level of their professional 
skepticism and return to stages (1) and (2) as necessary. Such feedback action 
can reinforce the cognitive process. In particular with respect to stages (3) 
and (4), auditors need to develop their ability to think critically (reflectively) 
about all of their judgments in assessing the evidence, interpreting what the 
evidence says, and selecting what evidence to document: this thinking repre-
sents inward skepticism.
5.  Defining professional skepticism
The definition of professional skepticism as “an attitude that includes a 
questioning mind and a critical assessment of audit evidence“ (SAS No. 99 
[ASB 2002b, par.13]) has been widely accepted as the starting point for dis-
cussing the subject. But, it is neither comprehensive nor operational enough 
to explain the dynamic (proactive and reactive) and multi-faceted nature of 
skepticism in relation to the cognition process and thus may hinder its mea-
surement.
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Professional skepticism in a financial statement audit is broadly defined 
as an ongoing process of raising sufficient and appropriate questions, outwardly 
and inwardly, individually and organizationally, and proactively and reactively 
at each stage of the cognition process⑽. This definition implies that auditors 
can look at professional skepticism differently in terms of (1) who exercises it, 
that is, individually or organizationally (collectively or at the organization 
level) and (2) the direction of the skepticism, that is, outward or inward. Rais-
ing appropriate questions in verifying the proposition with pertinent evidence 
from other sources includes “why” and “why not” (Baril et al. 1998, 392; Ran-
zilla et al. 2011).
Figure 2 summarizes the relationship between who exercises professional 
skepticism and its direction.
Figure 2  Who exercises professional skepticism and the direction






・ assessing the quality 
and quantity of evidence 
collected
・ wrong, poor, or insufficient  evidence
・ inappropriate audit procedures
・ suggested irregularities/inconsistencies
Inward
・ auditors’ own judgments 
about their evidential 
observations
・ misjudgments or inappropriate 
judgments by audit staff or partners
・ negative instances or overlooked signs
・ evidence of fabrication/marshalling
─────────────────
⑽　The author thinks that the professional skepticism to be exercised at the acceptance/continu-
ance (engagement) stage should be separated from that at the subsequent stages and so assumes 
that the cognitive process starts at the planning stage. However, following is an important but 
hypothetical observation: “The degree of professional skepticism for an engagement may be effec-
tively set at the client-acceptance/continuance stage of the audit,” and “any subsequent 
consideration of management integrity that could arise, for example, when assessing fraud risk 
during audit planning, may not sufficiently adjust the auditor’s mindset and, therefore, not affect 
the audit plan and professional skepticism” (Shelton et al. 2001, 22). On the basis of audit practitio-
ners’ expressed concern, “after the auditor assesses management integrity, he/she develops an 
impression that is difficult to alter” (Shelton et al. 2001, 22).
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5-1  Raising questions outwardly and inwardly
In raising questions outwardly, auditors assess the quality of evidence 
from internal and external sources. The audit literature and professional stan-
dards have conventionally emphasized the importance of outward skepticism 
especially in assessing audit evidence: raising questions (inquiry) alone is not 
enough. Auditors must obtain sufficient and competent evidence. In raising 
questions inwardly, auditors direct skepticism towards their own judgment 
processes. Inward skepticism, which generally corresponds to “reflection-in-
action” (SchÖn 1983, 69), has also been recognized by Bell et al. (2005, 483) 
and covers the entire cognitive process. Peecher et al. (2011), who approach 
professional skepticism in terms of how to increase the quality of the finan-
cial statement audit, proposed a reform “to refine the concept of professional 
skepticism so that auditors must actively question their own judgment-process 
quality” (2005, 39: emphasis added). In this connection, Bell et al. (2005, 34) also 
emphasize the concept of inward skepticism, in which auditors question both 
their own judgments and the effectiveness of the process through which 
these judgments are made.
5-2  Raising questions individually and organizationally (collectively)
Raising questions individually is the most basic form of professional skep-
ticism. In most cases, individual auditors pose questions to the clients, get 
responses, then either identify a pertinent assertion to be scrutinized or 
assess the validity, relevance, reliability, and sufficiency of the evidence for 
the assertion, explicit or implicit, and eventually verify the responses. In this 
sense, raising appropriate questions in an appropriate form is crucial.
Raising questions organizationally has received more emphasis in recent 
audit literature. Inadequate audit procedures and erroneous or poor quality 
evidence are, directly or indirectly, creeping into working papers, in addition 
to inappropriate practices (evidence fabrication and evidence marshaling). 
Working paper reviews by superiors or concurrent reviewers and discussions 
within an audit team are the final inward-organizational stage for exercising 
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skepticism to uncover negative instances (counterfactuals) or area that need 
more or more relevant evidence. The AICPA (Center for Audit Quality 2010, 
24) stressed the importance of face-to-face meetings (“brainstorming”) among 
team members to discuss the potential for material misstatement due to 
fraud or any other reason.
6.  The dual nature of professional skepticism⑾
Auditing is the human action of assessing, on the basis of evidence, the 
quality of what (a statement) others have written or what (an action) they 
have or have not performed. Unlike accounting, which is concerned with por-
traying the financial condition of a company, the substance of auditing 
consists of raising doubts (a skeptical mindset) about either the statement or 
the action. Such an activity originates in the human action of pursuing knowl-
edge of what is true.
The cognition in a financial statement audit belongs broadly to the cate-
gory of human actions called knowing about the world, in that auditors form 
their beliefs about the truthfulness of a particular proposition on the basis of 
observations (evidence). Critical thinking and raising questions are closely 
associated with obtaining appropriate knowledge. Audit skepticism is essen-
tially related to this pursuit. The basic nature of such cognition (or pursuit) is 
characterized as epistemic, but in a broad sense; that is, it is based on “a mat-
ter of more or less true” resulting from observations/evidence. Professional 
skepticism is characterized here as “epistemic skepticism.” It is separate from 
“forensic skepticism,” which focuses only on the detection of inappropriate 
human acts or negative items/instances.
Epistemic skepticism has two aspects: epistemic width (scope) and epis-
temic depth. The former aspect is concerned with what form, positive or 
negative, and the number of appropriate propositions auditors frame in rela-
─────────────────
⑾　Arguments and discussions under this section are based on Toba (2011) with extensions and 
modifications.
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tion to the financial statements. The more propositions auditors frame in 
relation to an account, transaction, or disclosure, the more widely they exer-
cise their skepticism; if they reactively switch the proposition from positive 
to negative, they widen their skeptical scope in a different way. This aspect 
is not only a matter of proposition framing but also a matter of verification 
(positive vs. negative approaches, or confirmation vs. falsification). In addition, 
it also includes what propositions are appropriate in a financial statement 
audit.
The epistemic depth is concerned with what kind of evidence and how 
much evidence auditors collect in order to convince themselves of the truth 
of a particular proposition. The more competent evidence they collect, the 
more deeply they are convinced. This aspect is basically related to perform-
ing (selecting and applying) procedures and assessing evidence both in quality 
and in quantity. It represents the auditors’ investigative stance: the neutrality 
view vs. the presumptive doubt view. Figure 3 presents an overall framework 
for understanding the role of professional skepticism in terms of the two 
axes, which reflect its dual nature (epistemic width and epistemic depth).
Figure 3  A framework for understanding the role of professional skepticism 
in a financial statement audit
Width (scope)












Doubt View II IV
Viewed within the philosophy of auditing, the positive approach (confir-
mation) and the negative approach (falsification) are not mutually exclusive, 
but rather complementary, and support the entire process of audit cognition. 
The universe of potential sources of misstatements is large; therefore, audi-
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tors may need to inquire more deeply and more extensively to uncover them, 
and the confirmation approach alone is often not effective in circumstances 
where management has used skillful schemes to deliberately distort financial 
statements. This issue is not simply a matter of an auditor’s attitude toward 
collecting/assessing evidence and testing (epistemic depth), but also a matter 
of proposition framing (epistemic width).
Regardless of whether auditors take the neutrality view or the presump-
tive doubt view, they must remain independent, sincere, and objective in their 
decisions. However, their level of skepticism will differ according to (1) how 
strongly they come to believe in the possibility that a particular account or 
item may be materially misstated, (2) how strongly they recognize the possi-
bility that material misstatements are due to fraud, (3) whether they become 
aware of unusual or unnatural matters (items, transactions, or conditions) in 
the field, and (4) how seriously they recognize a GC risk. The level of skepti-
cism changes proactively depending on the degree of risk they perceive and 
also reactively depending on audit findings in the field.
6-1  The epistemic width (scope) of audit skepticism: Two ways of knowing
What propositions the auditor selects and how they are framed (i.e. posi-
tively or negatively, and explicitly or implicitly) not only can influence the 
way of knowing but also widen or shrink the scope of skepticism, an aspect 
of professional skepticism that has so far not received sufficient attention. 
Both confirmation (substantiation: a positive approach) and falsification (refu-
tation: a negative approach) are basic ways of knowing in the philosophy of 
science and both, though having different meanings, are possible under a 
financial statement audit.
The philosophy literature (Salmon 1967; Popper 1968; Quine and Ullian 
1970; Chalmers 1999) explains two different ways of knowing: confirmation 
and falsification. Confirmation (substantiation) is based on the idea that the 
strength of the evidence increases with each piece of such supporting evi-
dence. Thus, auditors confirm a particular proposition by increasing the 
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amount of positive evidence. The more positive evidence, the higher the prob-
ability that the evidence is persuasive. But confirmation as a means of 
verification carries an epistemic problem (i.e. confirmation bias, confirmation-
proneness).
There is another way of knowing in the philosophy of science: it is a neg-
ative or counter-evidencing approach called falsification. Popper (1968) 
advocated falsification as the most powerful alternative to confirmation. It 
stresses the function of negative evidence or negative instances related to the 
positive proposition and emphasizes the strength of negative evidence over 
positive (affirmative) evidence. Quine and Ullian (1970, 67-68) explain the 
asymmetry between affirmation and negation as follows:
A lawlike generalization, then, is confirmed by each of its instances. An 
instance does not of course clinch the generalization, but each instance 
adds to the plausibility of it. A generalization with even a single false 
instance, on the other hand, is irremediably false. Any hypothesis, indeed 
any statement at all, which implies a falsehood, is itself false. This asym-
metry is pure logic: what implies a truth may be true or false, but what 
implies a falsehood is false. It would appear to be easier, therefore, to 
refute a false hypothesis than to establish a true one. (emphasis added)
6-1-1  Confirmation as the positive approach
Confirmation is generally used to support (substantiate) the proposition 
(for example P-1 and P-3, as mentioned in 3-2). However, it involves a human 
(psychological) problem in that when trying to collect information, people 
tend to seek out information that potentially confirms their belief over infor-
mation that might disconfirm it (Gilovich 1991, 32-33). McMillan and White 
(1993, 443 and 463) suggest that confirmation bias and professional skepticism 
have a complementary effect on auditors’ evidence evaluation and evidence 
search and that “confirmatory behaviors may not prevail or dominate in the 
audit judgment process.” Church (1990) and Guiral et al. (2011) suggest that 
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auditors exhibit a confirmation-prone attitude toward evidence and, more 
importantly, that confirmation proneness is likely to erode professional skepti-
cism and impair audit effectiveness. Bamber et al. (1997, 250) go so far as to 
state that a confirmation-prone attitude appears to conflict with professional 
standards.
Confirmation assumes that auditors basically look for evidence that sup-
ports, not negates, a particular proposition. It does not follow, however, that 
they ignore negative evidence. They must carefully assess the evidence, 
determine whether it contains some negative signs, and judge what it tells 
them. The affirmative approach is still the prevailing GAAS practice, but 
combined with the positive statements from management, it may erode skep-
ticism and may explain, in part, why auditors often make do with the 
evidence management supplies.
6-1-2  Falsification as the negative approach
The negative approach, falsification, is a cognitive methodology in which, 
in order to verify the proposition (for example, P-2 and P-4 as mentioned in 
3-2), auditors proactively search for negative instances or their signs that 
may lead to material misstatements. This negative approach might be equiva-
lent to a "forensic-type fieldwork phase" (POB 2000, 75-76, 88), but it is not a 
forensic audit per se: the evidential focus of the auditors under the GAAS 
audit is, to the last, a statement̶not an action̶by management.
In order to heighten the degree of professional skepticism at the firm 
level, falsification must be explicit (documented) and effectively shared among 
the audit team or the entire organization. One cannot see what is implicit. 
Therefore, communication among the audit team members and careful 
review of working papers, both of which help to make falsification explicit, 
are crucial in heightening the auditors’ professional skepticism (Harding and 
Trotman 2011).
Shifting the focus from positives to negatives or adding to such a new 
perspective can impact the width and depth of skepticism, and recognizing 
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the negative approach has the potential to significantly change financial state-
ment audit theory and practice.
6-2   The epistemic depth of audit skepticism: Neutrality and presumptive 
doubt
The epistemic depth refers to the auditors’ attitude toward raising 
appropriate questions at each stage of the cognition process and is fundamen-
tally related to how deeply the auditors exercise their skepticism in planning 
audit programs, performing audit procedures, documenting, and reviewing 
the results. The two attitudes identified so far to represent the degrees of 
skepticism are neutrality and presumptive doubt.
As with the width (framing), the depth (degree) of skepticism required 
depends on whether the audit engagement is initial or continuous, on what 
was uncovered in the previous audit, and on whether the auditors have 
uncovered negative instances or signs which may influence the fair presenta-
tion of the financial statements or have uncovered or suspected fraud. The 
degree of skepticism also depends on (1) how well acquainted the auditors 
are with the client’s business and business model and its industry, (2) the 
materiality of any assertion (explicit or implicit) related to accounts, items, or 
disclosures in the financial statements or to transactions underlying the state-
ments, and (3) a variety of risks the auditors face in relation to the client (such 
as the opacity of the corporate governance, management’s aggressiveness in 
determining accounting policy, and weaknesses in internal controls).
The degree of skepticism is changeable, and different concepts are 
needed to mirror the different degrees; nevertheless SAS No. 99 (ASB 2002b) 
deleted the references to the AICPA’s previous position on professional skep-
ticism (the neutrality view) and current GAAS (SASs and ASs) have not 
explicitly stated the degree(s) of skepticism that an auditor should exercise. 
The deletion leaves room for interpretation. One may interpret SAS No. 99 
as going no further than stating that the neutrality view is inappropriate 
when there is a possibility that material misstatements are due to fraud, and 
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another may interpret SAS No. 99 as indicating that the neutrality view itself 
is no longer appropriate.
6-2-1  The neutrality view
The neutrality view, later called the neutral concept of professional skep-
ticism (POB 2000, 76), is the attitude that the auditors should neither 
unquestionably assume management’s honesty nor flatly deny it. This view, 
which has been, perhaps symbolically, called “healthy skepticism” and “rea-
sonable skepticism” (Anderson 1977, 125), was the conventional view of 
skepticism at least until SAS No. 82 (ASB 1997) and has been the premise for 
empirical research on evidence evaluation (Haynes 1999). It emphasizes that 
auditors should hold an unbiased view of management’s honesty (dishonesty); 
a financial statement audit based on a presumption of dishonesty would be 
contrary to the audit culture. However, the neutrality view is less tenable in 
actual practice; The critical issue is not whether management is honest or 
dishonest but that management has incentives to prepare financial state-
ments that contain material misstatements. In the neutrality view, auditors 
assume no material bias in management’s statements ex ante (Nelson 2009; 
Quadackers et al. 2012).
6-2-2  The presumptive doubt view
Audit failures suggest that the neutrality approach alone is not sufficient. 
No matter how much “healthy” or “reasonable” skepticism the auditors have 
exercised, management has been able to design very complex and skillful̶
and initially successful̶schemes for fraudulent financial reporting. This fact 
indicates the need to consider the presumptive doubt view. .
Bell et al. (2005) and Nelson (2009) have contributed to the recognition of 
this new perspective, but this view per se has not enjoyed either official or 
prescribed status⑿, even though Nelson (2009, 3) observed that “regulators 
appear to take more of the ‘presumptive doubt’ perspective, as they typically 
refer to professional skepticism as something that was missing when an audit 
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failure has occurred.” The presumptive doubt view stresses that auditors 
take a proactive approach to the fact that management may have incentives 
to intentionally misstate amounts or disclosures. It generally implies serious 
questioning of things and situations. Thus, as pointed out by Nelson (2009), 
management may strongly oppose this explicit orientation.
Early on, Burton (1980, 53) mentioned that “the auditor should perhaps 
become an investigator, starting with the assumption that his responsibility is 
to find errors [and fraud (added)] rather than to participate in a cooperative 
process designed to report in the most meaningful fashion. This would 
require auditors to adopt much higher standards of proof while essentially 
eliminating reliance on representations of management.” The presumptive 
doubt orientation, however, does not mean that the GAAS audit should be 
restructured as a forensic audit. Auditors cannot be held responsible for 
uncovering material misstatements caused by all types of fraud or illegal 
actions because collusive fraud and other intricate schemes such as “special 
purpose companies,” as already experienced in Enron (Batson 2003, 76), “cir-
cular transactions,” and “tobashi transactions” are difficult to uncover. The 
presumptive doubt orientation does, rather, call for auditors to exercise more 
skepticism proactively and reactively, to extensively and rigidly assess the 
internal and external risks that they face, and then to apply the audit risk 
approach more effectively.
7.  The Search for a framework for audit skepticism⒀
Figure 3 shows a basic framework to help auditors understand where 
they stand with respect to skepticism. The framework consists of four cells 
─────────────────
⑿　Quadackers et al. (2012) conducted an experimental study which examined the relationship 
between two individual trait measures of professional skepticism (“neutrality” and “presumptive 
doubt”) and a set of auditors’ professional judgments and decisions concerning analytical proce-
dures. However, the research design may have been flawed because the current GAAS is too 
ambiguous to understand how the different perspectives on skepticism should.
⒀　Arguments and discussions under this section are based on Toba (2011) with extensions and 
modifications.
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in which the two axes (the epistemic width [horizontal] axis and the epistemic 
depth [vertical] axis) each represent a notional mode that shows a combina-
tion of the two axes. The framework is flexible: by combining two or more 
cells the auditors can determine the most appropriate level of skepticism for 
the circumstances.
The four notional modes (Cells I to IV) each define a different level of 
professional skepticism and of audit effectiveness and efficiency. But no mode 
alone constitutes the entire skeptical mindset to be exercised during an 
engagement. Different levels of skepticism can be combined depending on the 
circumstances. This section develops several forms of combined levels of pro-
fessional skepticism and explains their meanings in audit practice.
The presumptive doubt orientation does not mean it is applied, regard-
less of the circumstances, in every audit, in every assertion, in every 
transaction, in every account, in every disclosure, and in any specific stage of 
the cognition process, The level of skepticism represented by the neutrality 
view suffices for some financial statement items and transactions, and does 
not for others. Auditors’ skeptical mindset may be on the neutrality level in 
planning an audit program and later shifted to the presumptive doubt level 
depending on their findings. The framework for audit skepticism allows audi-
tors to proactively and reactively change the level according to the risk 
(circumstances) assessment. The framework should serve to improve not only 
audit effectiveness but also audit efficiency.
7-1  Mode I: The positive approach with the neutrality view
Skepticism under Mode I is moderately strong. This level of skepticism 
is appropriate when the materiality of an assertion, an account or item, or a 
transaction and the degree of risk is moderate. This mode is explainable in 
terms of the postulate “no necessary conflict of interest between the auditor 
and the management of the enterprise under the audit” (Mautz and Sharaf 
1961, 42) and its interpretation: both the management and auditors are inter-
ested in the same result ‒ that is, the fair presentation of financial statements 
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(Mautz 1958, 41).
One possible interpretation of SAS No. 99 is that Mode I is no longer 
allowable. If SAS No. 99 is interpreted in this way, perhaps a natural conse-
quence that has been accepted by the audit community in the United States 
as a lesson of the audit failures in 2001 and 2002, a financial statement audit 
in the United States may well be simpler with respect to its skepticism 
framework and higher in quality: But there must be possible differences 
between assuming Mode I, Mode II, or both, even among developed countries 
with IAASB membership. Whatever negative/social reactions follow audit 
failures, the basic structure of a financial statement audit cannot be founded 
solely on the Robertson postulate that there is always a potential conflict of 
interest between the auditor and the management of the enterprise under 
audit.” There is a need for explicating the Mautz & Sharaf postulate in dis-
cussing professional skepticism in a financial statement audit.
The neutrality view requires that auditors presume neither the freedom 
from nor the inclusion of material misstatements: In other words, the auditors 
remain “neutral” until evidence proves otherwise. Propositions written in the 
form of P-1 and P-3 represent Mode I. Provided that an extensive assessment 
of the risks has been done on accounts, items, disclosures and transactions 
included in or underlying the financial statements, the neutrality view allows 
auditors to make a balanced consideration as to the integrity and expertise of 
people (including management) and the effectiveness of the organization 
(internal controls) and also to assume the competence of evidence unless evi-
dence appears to be unnatural, unusual, incomplete, or informal. The 
neutrality level may generally suffice for verifying the fair presentation of a 
particular account or item that may be materially misstated because of mis-
takes in accounting procedures or treatments.
7-2  Mode II: The positive approach with the presumptive doubt view
Mode II also reflects the positive approach: audit propositions are posi-
tive, explicitly and implicitly. Under Mode Ⅱ , auditors are more skeptical 
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than neutral. Mode II assumes a potential conflict of interest between the 
auditor and the management (i.e. the Robertson postulate). Depending on the 
circumstances, auditors may become (or need to be) more aware that a par-
ticular item or account may be materially misstated and that the material 
misstatements may be due to fraud, but they stay with confirmation (positive 
propositions). Or they may recognize a higher risk that the financial state-
ments of a newly merged/acquired company may include material 
misstatements due to substantial mistakes in accounting treatments or 
accounting procedures. Propositions written in the form of P-2 and P-4 repre-
sent Mode II.
In Mode II, auditors carefully substantiate unusual/unnatural items with 
more persuasive evidence (or with “not less than persuasive evidence” [SAS 
No. 87 and SAS No. 99]), perhaps from different sources (triangulation: Bell et 
al. 2005), and then determine whether a related component of the financial 
statements is materially misstated. An unusual or unnatural item by itself 
may be a symptom of a misstatement but does not signal misstatements. In 
the current circumstances, auditors have been required to stay with Mode II 
more than previously in order to maintain the quality of the audit as a whole.
7-3  Mode III: The negative approach with the neutrality view
The neutrality view may not be consistent with the negative approach 
orientation (falsification) because to recognize negative propositions (in the 
form of Ns) reflects a heightened skeptical mindset, not a neutral mindset. In 
this sense, Cell III as represented by Mode III has null content. The neutral-
ity perspective urges auditors to stay with only confirmation, to close their 
eyes to any negative propositions; conversely, the negative approach demands 
that auditors do not stay with the neutrality mindset but with the presump-
tive doubt mindset. Looking at skepticism in the light of the framework as 
shown in Figure 3, Mode III can be reasonably understood as null.
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7-4  Mode IV: The negative approach with the presumptive doubt view
Professional skepticism under Mode IV is more robust than under any 
other Mode, close to forensic skepticism. If auditors become aware of the 
high possibility that a particular item and account is materially misstated, 
based on assessing the risks, they may wish proactively, particularly at the 
planning stage, to shift their epistemic width from confirmation to falsifica-
tion. In addition, they need to reactively move to Mode IV when they 
recognize in the findings a greater possibility that materially and pervasively 
misstated financial statements are due to management fraud. Therefore, this 
level of skepticism is appropriate only when the auditors seriously doubt the 
integrity of the financial statements as a whole.
Mode IV is also allowable when the auditors face unusual or unnatural 
items, especially in the field. Although unusualness or unnaturalness itself 
does not mean something bad, it may at times be associated with manage-
ment fraud. When the auditors consider the possibility of management fraud, 
they may decide that confirming P-1 is not enough and change their epis-
temic width from confirmation to falsification (N-4) in order to obtain a 
stronger assurance that no material misstatements have been caused by 
management fraud. Of course, they are also able to obtain similar assurance 
through confirmation, but the required level of skepticism is lower. Under 
Mode IV, the auditor focuses on uncovering unusual or unnatural items in 
order to verify the propositions (Ns). In other words, the focus becomes closer 
to that of a “forensic-type” audit (POB 2000, 88).
Under Mode IV, auditors can recognize a negative proposition implicitly. 
For example, they may recognize that “a particular transaction with XYZ 
company included in the balance of accounts receivable is fictitious” and focus 
on uncovering (negative) evidence to substantiate it. The “implicit/negative” 
is appropriate under Mode IV; false explicit negatives could strain an auditor’
s relationship with management or jeopardize the audit engagement itself, 
and could also be costly.
Mode IV must be managed by the entire audit team or by the account-
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ing firm because it is by no means ordinary to recognize negative 
propositions, even implicitly. Unusual/unnatural situations must be docu-
mented in the working papers as explicitly as possible, so that the audit team 
can share the situational information including what, how deeply, and why 
individual auditors come to have serious doubts.
When auditors in charge on the scene become aware of the possibility of 
fraudulent accounting schemes with external interested parties (especially 
including banks), they may reactively wish to consider N-2 instead of P-2, and 
then focus on uncovering pertinent negative evidence. They will become 
more concerned with examining, for example, whether sales transactions are 
real or fictitious, with evidence from appropriate sources including support 
from the firm’s forensic team.
7-5  Conditions for shifting the level of audit skepticism
Within the framework of the three Modes, auditors determine the level 
of skepticism most applicable to the circumstances. First, in planning the 
audit procedures, they need to choose an initial level (referred to as “the 
base”) based on the results of assessing the company’s internal/external risks. 
Ideally, the base should be determined on separate accounts, items, and dis-
closures in the financial statements, and on classes of separate transactions 
underlying the financial statements. Audit skepticism should not be fixed to a 
single level, that is, the level represented by the presumptive doubt view⒁. 
The level needed is a matter of judgment depending on how seriously the 
auditors assess the internal and external risks they face.
─────────────────
⒁　If one interprets SAS No. 99 as institutionally admitting only one level of skepticism (i.e. the 
presumptive doubt view with confirmation: Mode II), the concept of audit skepticism will be dis-
cussed within a limited domain and so will not be further developed or explicated academically 
and practically. Without a conceptual framework for audit skepticism but with the concept of risk 
in auditing and in business, auditors can succeed (have succeeded) in responding reactively/flexi-
bly to risks internally and externally. To put it another way, the basic idea of changing audit 
action (including auditing procedures) in response to the client’s business risk environment is 
inherently embedded in the audit risk model.
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Generally speaking, Modes I and II are available as the base of any 
engagement. It is not practical to predetermine when to shift the base to 
Mode IV. Figure 5 presents general examples of conditions when auditors 
may need to shift to a heightened level. Two types of conditions (A and B) 
are included there. Type A enumerates conditions when auditors uncover 
unusual or unnatural accounting items as a result of testing, and Type B enu-
merates conditions when they perceive an increased possibility that material 
misstatements due to fraud are included in the financial statements or have 
an intuition that something is wrong with the financial statements and the 
company under audit.
Assuming that auditors have chosen Mode I as the base for a particular 
item or transaction, when they uncover unusual or unnatural items in the 
field (for example numbers 1-7 in Figure 5), they can ascertain whether any 
material misstatements result from such irregularities in staying with Mode I 
or by shifting the level of skepticism to Mode II, both of which belong to con-
firmation. If auditors choose Mode II, they may be more effective in 
ascertaining misstatements but with a decrease in audit efficiency. In addi-
tion, under the same assumption, when auditors face unusual situations (for 
example numbers 8-15 in Figure 5), they may decide it will be difficult to sub-
stantiate resulting material misstatements by staying with Mode I, so will 
consider moving to Mode II. They may be more effective in substantiation if 
they choose Mode II initially, but with a decrease in efficiency.
On the other hand, assuming that auditors’ base is Mode II, when they 
face unusual situations (for example numbers 8-15), they can decide to stay 
with Mode II or will probably move to Mode IV (falsification) in order to 
increase their skeptical mindset to the highest level, which usually demands a 
forensic type of auditing. Exercising a heightened level of professional skepti-
cism does not mean simply raising more questions or increasing the quantity 
and quality of evidence to support the positive proposition, but looking at the 
negative side of a proposition,
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Figure 5  Possible conditions for increasing audit skepticism
Type A
1 .  When auditors uncover a material transaction that is doubtful in light of the client’s normal 
course of business.
2 .  When auditors recognize material inconsistencies among books, documents, and records in 
relation to significant transactions.
3 .  .When an appropriate accounting treatment of a key transaction has not been settled close to 
the year-end.
4 .  When auditors uncover an unnatural correction of an accounting treatment near the year-end 
which substantially influences the current earnings.
5 .  When auditors uncover unexplainable inconsistencies within the accounting books or between 
the accounting books and records.
6 .  When a client changes the assumptions underlying the accounting estimates without any 
underlying change in the business environment
7 .  When there is an unadjustable or unexplained material difference between the amount of a 
particular item/account the customer supplied in response to the auditor’s request for confir-
mation and the corresponding amount on the book.
Type B
8 .  When auditors receive information from a whistle-blower (internal or external) about the pos-
sibility of fraud that influences financial statements of the client
9 .  When auditors face situations suggesting the possibility of off-balance sheet transactions 
involving a money reflux.
10.  When auditors become aware of opaque lending, borrowing, and offering/receiving collateral 
or guarantees for debt in relation to the client’s related parties and other parties lacking a 
transparent relationship.
11.  When auditors perceive the possibility that documents including contracts and minutes have 
been forged or altered
12.  When basic documents that support a key transaction are unavailable or only drafts or copies 
are available.
13.  When a client interferes with the auditor’s confirmation procedures (for example, to change 
the addressee of an audit confirmation letter or to suggest that auditors should postpone con-
firmation requests to a certain company/person)
14.  When auditors judge that the competence and objectivity of an expert whom the client uses 
with respect to a particular transaction which materially influences financial statements is 
questionable.
15.  When auditors are not provided with sufficient information about the client’s customers, 
investment partners (i.e. funds, SPEs, and other investees), and key custodians of the client’s 
assets.
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8.   Explicit positives in accounting and implicit negatives  
in auditing
Accounting is naturally positive and explicit. It essentially represents the 
company’s economic/financial position, which cannot be identified and 
observed directly, as information (a set of statements) that management pre-
pares using accounting language, its peculiar data processing, and established 
accounting criteria (i.e. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles). The out-
put is presented as financial statements. In this sense, accounting is explicit.
Managers have conventionally used accounting to show that they have 
fulfilled their accountability based on market transactions as well as on mana-
gerial stewardship. They are essentially interested in asserting that, through 
keeping orderly and correct accounts and records and then preparing truth-
ful financial statements, they have honestly and appropriately discharged 
their managerial responsibility. In this sense, accounting per se is positive.
The positive nature of an assertion, together with other factors such as a 
demand for efficiency and time/budget constraints (including a deadline) as 
well as the auditors’ human characteristics (traits) may suppress the exercise 
of robust skepticism. In addition, the evidence they collect may introduce 
epistemic difficulties: (1) accounting books and records that have been forged 
or altered often may look good, (2) kind behavior from client personnel may 
undermine the auditor’s skepticism, and (3) the genuineness of physical evi-
dence (for example, inventories) and the real state of affairs (for example, the 
progress of construction and basic assumptions underlying the management’s 
accounting estimates) may be difficult for the auditors to assess.
The coexistence of positives with negatives is the reality of financial 
statements prepared by management: Positives favor explicitness, while neg-
atives abhor it. Negatives are prone to be concealed and to stay implicit. 
Exercising or heightening professional skepticism means “smelling out” the 
existence of negatives and then making them explicit. In other words, exer-
cising professional skepticism means successfully coping with implicit 
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negatives both present in and absent from the financial statements.
9.  Closing remarks with further research opportunities
Audit failures have often resulted from the failure to review working 
papers thoroughly and reflectively in terms of (1) whether the audit staff in 
the field became aware of anything unnatural or unusual that suggests the 
possibility of misstatements, (2) whether the audit staff adequately considered 
the appropriateness of the instructions in the audit checklists in view of the 
findings, and (3) whether the staff followed up on any unnatural or unusual 
items. Time and budget pressures may cause auditors to focus only on 
“checking the compliance.” The conventional form of the working papers by 
itself may decrease effectiveness in that it may (1) prevent the audit staff 
from freely raising doubts about the possibility of material misstatements and 
(2) make them reluctant to convey their doubts to the senior team members. 
Items or findings that the staff in the field believes are unnatural but which 
are still uncertain must be explicit and concrete in the working papers. The 
auditors can only overcome the “check-the box” or “compliance” mindsets 
when they have successfully reviewed the working papers.
Audit research has already stepped into more detailed and extensive 
analyses of the effects of confirming and disconfirming evidence in the pro-
cess of forming beliefs, in evidence proneness in the planning stage, and in 
their relationship with professional skepticism. Empirical research, so far, has 
been concerned with how disconfirming evidence affects the degree of pro-
fessional skepticism (ex post analysis). It does not address either how 
falsification (the negative approach) affects the level of professional skepti-
cism or under what circumstances auditors shift from confirmation to 
falsification, or back (ex ante analysis). Under the framework of a financial 
statement audit and especially under GAAS, recognizing the negative 
approach may be challenging.
Giving increased recognition to the negative approach (Mode IV) may 
provoke opposition from auditors, academic and practicing. It is true that the 
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negative approach has been beyond the academic horizon except for 
Smieliauskas (1999), and Fukukawa and Mock (2011). It may also be true that, 
in general, auditors have been unskilled at dealing with the negative approach 
and its implications in practice. But recognizing the negative approach as one 
strategy to heighten auditors’ professional skepticism differs from conducting 
a forensic audit. The negative approach is not a response to the observation 
that “growing public sentiment demands that auditors should be fraud detec-
tives” (Venuti et al. 2002, 33).
However strong public demand has grown, we should not shift the basic 
nature of a financial statement audit to that of a forensic or fraud detection 
audit. Skepticism issues must be discussed with the basic understanding that 
the financial statement audit is not an “action” audit. The base should stay 
with positive propositions, explicit and implicit. However, auditors need to 
proactively and reactively combine the base mode (modes) with Mode IV, 
when appropriate, so that the whole level of their professional skepticism is 
responsive to the circumstances.
Both academic and practicing auditors have stressed that professional 
skepticism must be healthy and heightened. Unhealthy skepticism means (1) 
collecting evidence solely to satisfy the auditor’s curiosity, (2) collecting evi-
dence unnecessarily in such a way as to impair the relationship of mutual 
trust with management, and (3) recognizing an explicit negative proposition. 
Healthy skepticism can support and enhance engagements with roots in 
mutual trust between auditor and client. However, it is not a predisposition 
to accept management’s assertions without corroboration; it is an objective 
attitude of “tell me why and show me.”
Because auditors must struggle with the explicit positive nature of 
accounting, one single degree of professional skepticism is not enough. Fur-
ther research is needed not only “to determine under which circumstances 
confirmation proneness dominates, as opposed to a skeptical attitude toward 
evidence” (Guiral et al. 2011,174), but also to determine under which circum-
stances auditors decide to shift to a falsification approach.
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Auditors have perhaps not dealt effectively with the negative implicit 
aspects of　financial statements. Generally speaking, the negatives tend to be 
covered up in human society. The more material they become, the more skill-
fully they may be concealed or manipulated. Although management may be 
able to keep statement fraud covered up for a short time, in most cases, the 
cover-up cannot be maintained over the long term, largely because the cash 
or other assets supporting the fraudulent schemes eventually runs out. Ficti-
tious accounting figures often start small enough to be corrected, but usually 
grow. In spite of its explicit positive nature, accounting has entered an under-
ground world where fraud is better organized and better concealed with 
skillful schemes and management is better prepared to outwit auditors. 
Therefore, the real issue of professional skepticism lies in whether auditors 
can find a way to see the implicit negative world into which management 
may have stepped. In this sense, long-standing procedures that put audit per-
sonnel in touch with recurring transactions solely to confirm the accounting 
figures need to be scaled back (Wyatt 2004b, 26 ).
Although auditors may not have ignored the negative/implicit approach 
and may have taken advantage of “the implicit” so as to focus on “the nega-
tive,” when they face delicate and complex audit issues at the individual stage 
or even at the team stage, auditors may deliberately overlook negatives when 
they do not desire to make them explicit, in order to suspend judgment on 
them, to complete fieldwork by a deadline, and to reduce the cost of an audit.
Rather than asking auditors to mechanically follow a checklist, it is more 
important to ask them to raise the appropriate questions, both in and outside 
of management, and then to make explicit in their documents any questions, 
doubts, issues, and problems in their mind, even if the underlying intent and 
judgment are difficult to document. Team discussions of any negative signs 
including suspicions of fraud, as already required by SAS No. 99 (ASB 2002b), 
are also quite effective in making explicit something that members of the 
team have in mind. Training audit staff and developing the supporting tools 
are crucial in heightening the whole level of professional skepticism. Inquiry 
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as the most basic auditing technique and also as a means of face-to-face com-
munication must again be positively evaluated because raising the appropriate 
question to the appropriate person will help the auditor heighten skepticism 
in identifying appropriate propositions, evaluating the competence and suffi-
ciency of the evidence for the propositions, and finally in reaching an 
appropriate conclusion.
Audit research should focus on making explicit what stays negative and 
implicit. Implicitness always exists in our lingual world not only because of 
“the impossibility of complete explicitness” but also because of “strategic 
avoidance of making explicit” (Verschueren 1999, 25-31). An integration of 
explicit positives and implicit negatives in a conceptual framework will pro-
voke a more effective and more comprehensive foundation for audit cognition. 
Following is a list of research opportunities related to the negative aspect of 
a financial statement audit and audit skepticism in general
 1)  Does considering the negative approach (falsification) increase auditors’ 
skepticism or is it a result of increased skepticism? Either/or both? 
Does the negative approach necessarily increase the cost of auditing? 
Does the negative approach enhance audit quality (the level of assur-
ance provided)?
 2)  Under what circumstances do the auditors come to recognize the neg-
ative approach during the cognitive process? And under what 
circumstances and at which stage of the cognitive process have the 
auditors so far recognized falsification, explicitly or implicitly?
 3)  What effect does the negative approach have on the auditors’ planning, 
collecting, and assessing of evidence? Does the so-called audit risk 
approach assume the negative approach rather than the positive 
approach?
 4)  Is it possible to measure professional skepticism’s effectiveness and 
efficacy even ex post? What are the effects on professional skepticism 
of stylizing working papers?
 5)  What are the economics of professional skepticism? To put it another 
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way, what is the optimal level of audit skepticism in terms of effective-
ness, efficiency, and cost? How can it be determined?
 6)  How can working papers be stylized to better represent what audit 
staff have in their mind, particularly about negatives related to the 
cognition?
 7)  With respect to differences between a forensic audit and a financial 
statement audit, the Standing Advisory Group of the PCAOB (2004) 
posed “Discussion Question 49: Does a forensic accountant employ an 
investigative mindset that is different from the professional skepticism 
of an auditor of financial statements?”
 8)  Does the concept of professional skepticism constitute one of the basic 
concepts of auditing? If the answer is yes, what elements (including 
the neutrality and the presumptive doubt) constitute the concept? This 
is probably a more fundamental topic for audit research.
Recognizing that professional skepticism eventually reflects individual 
personal traits and is in essence a psychological trait, this paper takes the 
position that, in addition to its personal nature, it is epistemic/philosophical, 
organizational, economic, structural, and environmental. Professional skepti-
cism in auditing is really a multi-faceted concept.
Research, no matter its form, in attempting to measure the width (scope) 
and depth of audit skepticism, must struggle not only with its dual aspect, 
but also with the difficulty of its multi-faceted structure. Research into profes-
sional skepticism in auditing, a concept that is more difficult and broader than 
one might imagine, has only just begun. But an increased focus on profes-
sional skepticism should revitalize the auditing profession. The following 
passage with which Gilovich (1991, 194) finishes The Social Scientist’s Obliga-
tion is a fitting conclusion:
What is most important, then, is not dispelling particular erroneous 
beliefs (although there is surely some merit in that), but creating an 
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understanding of how we form erroneous beliefs. To truly appreciate the 
complexities of the world and the intricacies of human experience, it is 
essential to understand how we can be misled by the apparent evidence 
of everyday experience. This, in turn, requires that we think clearly 
about our experience, question our assumptions, and challenge what we 
think we know.
Postscript: The Need for Concept-oriented Research
In the world of accounting research, in a broad sense, it seems like a 
long time ago when accounting researchers developed their accounting (audit-
ing) approaches with their own but tenable perspectives on solving the issues 
facing them, and then produced their research results. Such research results 
were broadly shared in academia through papers and in particular, mono-
graphs. Accounting research results at that time were innovative/fresh in 
developing accounting thought, although most ideas remained without empiri-
cal support.
However, perhaps since the early 1980s (or late 1970s), the current data-
oriented type of research (the empirical research) has prevailed over the 
concept-oriented type of research. The current research methodology empha-
sizes that objectivity and interdisciplinarity with basic disciplines must be 
vigorously sustained and increased. The currently predominant academic 
inquiries are not necessarily a mistake: the functions, effects, and values in 
the broad sense of accounting must be critically analyzed, assessed, and 
reconsidered if necessary, as objectively as possible in market, organizational, 
social, and even cultural contexts. The empirical approach also serves to eval-
uate research output more objectively and allows for research results to 
become available in a relatively short period of time. We have to recognize, 
however, the potential risk that innovative opportunities for new concepts 
and new thought will shrink and that such ideas may not be explored, in 
other words, that academic ventures for progress will be nipped in the bud.
Concepts are the foundation for exploring and developing (new) account-
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ing and auditing theories as well as for understanding them. Concepts 
represent the “prism” through which a researcher looks at phenomena and at 
physical and human objects. Whatever concept we use might include hidden 
blind spots, or some part of an existing concept might not correctly look at 
the object or the phenomenon. Fundamental concepts are taught in the early 
stages of accounting education and are imbedded into students through text-
books, in-class exams, and more deeply through the CPA exams. Learning 
begins with an understanding of concepts, but once these concepts are imbed-
ded and form the basis of thinking, it becomes difficult to reconsider them 
with a critical eye. Many researchers, not only in the United States but also 
in Japan, have been inclined to accept the concepts and definitions produced 
by the accounting profession and simply proceed with empirical research 
based on them. This tendency weakens innovative research by academia.
In fields such as financial accounting and financial statement audits, 
which are tightly influenced by professional standards and have been incor-
porated into a legal system, innovative research has become especially 
difficult. In addition, recent research has been inclined to focus on narrower 
topics and on similar types of research and/or methods. Researchers have 
expressed serious concerns about the present orientation of accounting 
research (Demski 2001; Basu 2012; Waymire 2012). In order to respond to 
their voices positively, we accounting researchers must make the greatest 
effort to innovate in accounting/auditing, even though innovation in the sense 
of “creative destruction” as advocated by an economist of worldwide reputa-
tion, Schumpeter (1950, 83), may be very challenging in our legal environment 
and institutional affiliations.
There must be clues leading to innovative accounting studies. In design-
ing research projects and approaches, we may have counted more on 
economic terms/indexes (e.g. market price), financial terms/ratios (e.g. income 
and cash flow), uncertainty-related terms (e.g. business risk and audit risk) 
than on fundamental/social concepts underlying accounting (e.g. stewardship, 
accountability, management and control, responsibility, safeguarding of 
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assets). Conventional accounting concepts have been treated as plain, have 
stayed just as they were, and unfortunately may have come to be ignored. 
These concepts, although old, ought to be deeply rooted in the networks of 
our economic society and of corporate organizations. We as scholars living in 
the world of accounting, need to reflect on whether we have been dragged 
too much into thinking of accounting/auditing in relation to GAAP and 
GAAS.
Have we tried to fully “explicate” (Hempel 1952) the meaning/functions of 
these concepts not only in the contemporary context but also in the historical 
context of our economic society and in the organizational context of a busi-
ness corporation? Have we tried to explore the contemporary roles of these 
fundamental concepts of accounting, in particular in terms of promoting our 
welfare, strengthening our morality, and constructing the infrastructure of 
under-developed countries to help them emerge from their economic back-
wardness?
We have to have fundamental concepts underlying financial accounting 
and a financial statement audit that have been fully explicated in relation to 
the development of economic history as well as the emergence of new 
thought on social values. Such fundamental concepts must be continually re-
explicated, strengthened, and then preserved, however much our society 
changes. Accounting and auditing research have so far depended heavily on 
GAAP and GAAS while paying little heed to the development of new/
dynamic accounting/auditing ideas that can wrap up and appeal to all accoun-
tants.
A Japanese proverb says, “Fishing begins with carp (funa) and ends with 
carp (funa).” This means that in Japan, children learn how to fish for “carp” 
from their fathers, but they come to learn the true difficulty of fishing for 
“carp.” A researcher starts by learning a concept. Conceptual research seeks 
to conceptualize the object(s), of thought and then to develop a set of related 
concepts for a framework. This type of research is not easy, however, and 
takes a great deal of time. It is very difficult to shape ideas in a consistent 
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and effective way in a short period of time. In addition, for reviewers to 
review the results of conceptual research is challenging because the appraisal 
of its academic value often varies depending on who reviews it. But account-
ing scholars and in particular the American Accounting Association will, I 
believe, be able to overcome such difficulty.
Empirical research and conceptual research are like the two front (or 
rear) wheels of the car. If either is missing, the car won't move. This essay 
concludes with the words of Waymire (2012, 1077) to stimulate our innovative 
accounting and auditing research:
I define “scholarly innovation” as material long-run improvement in the 
state of knowledge within an academic discipline. The (unobservable) 
construct I have in mind is the change through time in the extent to 
which thinking about accounting is supported by a body of theory and 
empirical evidence that explains why accounting exists and takes the 
form that it does. Stated broadly, scholarly innovation refers to positive 
long-run change in the body of knowledge present in an academic disci-
pline.
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